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since it’s notoriously hard to remember to sit down and look at a random tab in your browser,
。在電腦瀏覽器中掃碼登入 WhatsApp，免安裝即可收發訊息对此有专业解读
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Владимир Седов (Редактор отдела «Силовые структуры»)
Distinguishing between relational wrongdoing and moral responsibility for causing unjust damage (that is, infringing rights against injury) requires fixing some terms. In ordinary moral discourse, terms such as “duty,” “right,” and “wrong” are polysemous. The term “duty,” as it is most commonly used, refers to a sort of norm of conduct, or standard of behavior, which tells us to refrain from acting in a certain way. A moral duty, so understood, is largely or exclusively an evidence-relative phenomenon: It reflects those reasons that are accessible to an agent from her epistemic and deliberative position.39 To violate a duty owed to another person is thus to wrong or mistreat her by giving insufficient weight in one’s moral deliberation to moral reasons that reflect her status as a “self-originating source[] of claims.”40 Sometimes the term “right” is used as a synonym or conceptual flipside of “duty” (and thus the correlative of “wrong”): To violate a duty owed to another person just is to violate her right and to wrong her. This is the usage that Cardozo himself seems to have had in mind when he spoke of duties, rights, and wrongs in Palsgraf, and defenders of the Palsgraf perspective largely follow him in this regard.41